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Genetic algorithms in optimal safety system design
R L Pattison and J D Andrews*
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Loughborough University, Leicestershire, UK
Abstract: This paper describes a design optimization scheme for systems that require a high
likelihood of functioning on demand. For safety systems whose failure could result in loss of life it
is imperative that the best use of the available resources is made and that a system which is optimal
and not just adequate is produced.
To demonstrate the practicalities of the method it has been applied to a high-integrity protection
system. Analyses of individual system designs are carried out using the latest advances in the fault
tree analysis technique utilizing the binary decision diagram approach.
A genetic algorithm (GA) is used to perform the optimization resulting in the final design
specification. Techniques are introduced to penalize the fitness of infeasible designs and to incorpo-
rate these values into the GA.
The latter part of the paper considers the effect of varying parameters, which affect the action of
the GA. A parameter combination is suggested which may achieve the most effective exploration of
the search space and, thus, result in the best system design.
Having implemented the GA it became apparent that areas of the algorithm could be improved.
The latter part of the paper investigates suggested improvements to particular processes of the
scheme.
Keywords: optimization, fault tree analysis, binary decision diagrams, genetic algorithms, design
1 INTRODUCTION
Failure of a safety system for a potentially hazardous
industrial system or process may have severe conse-
quences, possibly injuring members of the workforce or
public and occasionally resulting in loss of life. It is,
therefore, imperative that such systems have a high
likelihood of functioning on demand.
One measure of system performance is the probability
that the system will fail to operate when necessary.
Typically the design of a safety system follows the
traditional design process of preliminary design, analysis,
appraisal and redesign. If, following analysis, the initial
design does not meet some predetermined acceptability
target for system unavailability, deficiencies in the design
are removed and the analysis and appraisal stages are
repeated. Once the predicted system unavailability of a
design reaches the acceptable criteria, the design process
stops and the system is adopted. For a system whose
failure could result in fatality, it could be considered that
a merely adequate level for system unavailability is not
sufficient. The aim should be to produce the optimal
performance attainable within the constraints imposed
on resources.
It is highly unlikely that the design parameters can be
manually selected such that the optimal system perfor-
mance can be achieved within the available resources. An
approach, by which optimal performance can be ob-
tained using the fault tree analysis method to determine
the availability of each system design, was described in
a paper in 1994 [1]. An alternative methodology was
presented in a later paper [2], which incorporated the
latest advances in the fault tree analysis technique, using
binary decision diagrams [3–7] and utilized a genetic
algorithm (GA) [8, 9] to perform the optimization. The
research presented in this paper extends the approach in
reference [2] by investigating the effects of modifying the
GA process and the parameter values used. The GA
process is thus more accurate and effective.
2 SAFETY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Safety systems are designed to operate when certain
conditions occur and act to prevent or mitigate their
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development into a hazardous situation. Where poss-
ible, a safety system should not be designed such that
single component failure can prevent the system from
functioning. To ensure this, redundancy or diversity
can be incorporated into the system. Redundancy du-
plicates elements within a system while diversity in-
volves the addition of a totally different means of
achieving the same function.
Component selection is a second design option. Each
component selected for the design is chosen from a
group of possible alternatives. The design engineer must
decide how to trade off the specific characteristics of
each component to give the most effective overall sys-
tem performance.
The time interval between preventative maintenance
activities is a further consideration. This is generally
assigned on an ad hoc basis after the design has been
fixed. Significant gains are to be made by considering
the maintenance frequency at the design stage.
The choice of design is not, however, unrestricted.
Practical considerations place limits on resources,
which prevent a completely free choice of system de-
sign, rendering some design variations infeasible.
3 THE DESIGN OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The objective of the design optimization problem is to
minimize system unavailability by manipulating the
design variables such that limitations placed on them
by constraints are not violated. Commonly with mathe-
matical optimization problems, such as linear program-
ming, dynamic programming and sequential
unconstrained optimization [10], there will be an ex-
plicit objective function which defines how the charac-
teristic to be minimized is related to the variables.
In this problem an explicit objective function cannot
be formulated. The system performance is assessed
using a fault tree specifically representing the design in
question.
The nature of the design variables also adds difficulty
to the problem. Design variables that represent the
levels of duplication for fully or partially redundant
systems and the number of weeks between maintenance
activity are all integer. Selecting component types is
governed by Boolean variables, i.e. selection or non-se-
lection. A numerical scheme is, therefore, required that
produces integer values for these variables since it will
not be appropriate to utilize a method where real
numbers are rounded to the nearest whole number.
Constraints involved in this problem fall into the
category of either explicit or implicit constraints. The
cost and maintenance downtime can be represented by
an explicit function of the design parameters. However,
the number of spurious trips can only be calculated via
a full analysis of the system, which will again employ
the fault tree analysis technique.
4 GENETIC ALGORITHMS
GAs are a robust class of optimization techniques that
use principles mimicking those of natural selection and
genetics. Each system design is coded as a string of
parameter values. Each string is analogous to a chro-
mosome in nature. The method then works with a
population of strings.
The structure of the GA is that each string is as-
signed a measure of its fitness in the environment.
Selection (or reproduction as it is also known) then
exploits this fitness information. The greater the fitness
value the higher is the string’s chance of being selected
to enter the next generation.
The whole process is influenced by the action of the
genetic operators, typically cross-over and mutation.
These perturb the parameter information on each string
and allow for greater exploration about the search
space.
The basic method of selection allocates offspring to
the next generation via a biased roulette wheel. Each
string is assigned a certain percentage of the roulette
wheel depending on the size of their fitness value in
relation to the other strings in the population.
Cross-over involves crossing information between
two solution strings, already selected to enter the next
generation, from some randomly determined cross-over
point. Mutation is the alteration of a specific parameter
value on the solution string. Both operators enable
exploration of different system designs.
5 SYSTEM ANALYSIS
5.1 Use of fault trees
As no explicit objective function exists, fault trees are
used to quantify the system unavailability of each po-
tential design. It is, however, a time-consuming imprac-
tical task to construct a fault tree for each design
variation.
To resolve this difficulty, house events can be used to
enable the construction of a single fault tree capable of
representing causes of the system failure mode for each
possible system design. House events in the fault tree,
which are either TRUE or FALSE, are utilized to
switch on or off different branches to model the
changes in the causes of failure for each design
alternative.
Consider, for example, the choice of a valve type,
from the possible alternative valves V1,V2 or V3. The
structure of the tree is as shown in Fig. 1. If valve type
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Fig. 1 Fault tree structure for component selection
1 is selected the house event H1, corresponding to the
selection of this valve is set to TRUE. House events H2
and H3, corresponding to the selection of V2 and V3,
are conversely set to FALSE. A contribution to the top
event arises from the left-most branch only. The two
right-most branches are in effect switched off. Levels of
redundancy are handled in a similar manner.
The spurious trip frequency for each design is an
implicit constraint that requires the use of a fault trees
analysis to assess its value. House events are again used
to construct a fault tree capable of representing each
potential design for this failure mode.
5.2 Use of binary decision diagrams
In order to improve efficiency the binary decision dia-
gram (BDD) method is used to solve the resulting fault
tree. A BDD is a directed acyclic graph composed of
terminal and non-terminal vertices, which are con-
nected by branches. Terminal vertices have the value 0
or 1 and non-terminal vertices correspond to the basic
events of the fault tree. Each vertex has a 0 branch
which represents basic event non-occurrence (works)
and a 1 branch which represents basic event occurrence
(fails). Thus, all paths through the BDD terminate in
one of two states, either a 1 state, which corresponds to
system failure, or a 0 state, which corresponds to a
system success. The BDD represents the same logical
function as the fault tree from which it is developed. As
an example consider the BDD illustrated in Fig. 2.
Analysis of a BDD has proven to be more efficient
than the quantification of the fault tree structure itself.
This is because evaluation of the minimal cut sets for
use in the quantification is not required. In addition the
BDD produces more accurate results.
The fault tree structures for each system failure mode
are converted to their equivalent BDDs. A full descrip-
tion of the conversion process can be found in refer-
ences [3] and [4]. For the purpose of BDD construction,
where house events are encountered in the fault tree,
they are treated as basic events. Using this process the
fault tree for the component selection design variables,
shown in Fig. 1, can be represented by the BDD in Fig.
2.
The quantities q appearing on the 1 and 0 branches
developed from each node in Fig. 2 represent the
Fig. 2 Component selection BDD
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Fig. 3 High-integrity protection system
probability of going down each path. The house events
are turned on or off by setting their probability to 1 or
0 respectively. Consider, for example, the design where
valve 1 has been selected for the fault tree shown in Fig.
1. This is presented by H1=1, H2=0, H3=0 for the
house events and hence the corresponding probabilities
qH1=1, qH2=0 and qH3=0 are set on the equivalent
BDD. The only path to a terminal 1 node leaves V1
and H1 on their 1 branches which has probability qV1
as required.
Quantification of the BDD can be carried out in the
GA source code. The probability values assigned to
each house event, determined by the design in question,
are available within the package and hence are auto-
matically assigned to the BDD. In terms of practicality
this is the major advantage of the BDD.
6 EXAMPLE
As an example, the technique has been applied to the
simple high-pressure protection system taken from ref-
erence [2]. The basic features of the high-pressure pro-
tection system are shown in Fig. 2. Its function is to
prevent a high-pressure surge passing through the sys-
tem. In this way protection is provided for processing
equipment whose pressure rating would be exceeded.
The high pressure originates from a production well of
an offshore platform not normally manned and the
pieces of equipment to be protected are vessels located
downstream on the processing platform.
The first level of protection is to be the emergency
shut-down (ESD) subsystem. Pressure in the pipeline is
monitored using pressure transmitters (PTs). When the
pipeline pressure exceeds the permitted value, then the
ESD system acts to close the wing and master valves on
the well together with any ESD valves that have been
fitted.
To provide an additional level of protection, a sec-
ond level of redundancy can be incorporated by inclu-
sion of a high-integrity protection system (HIPS) (Fig.
3). This works in a similar manner to the ESD system
but is completely independent in operation.
Even with a relatively simple system such as this
there are a vast number of options for the designer to
consider. In the example it is required to determine
values for the design variables given in Table 1. Limita-
tions have been placed on the design as follows:
1. The total system cost must be less than 1000 units.
Hardware costs are given in Table 2.
2. The average time each year that the system resides
in the down state owing to preventative mainte-
nance must be less than 130 h. The times taken to
service each component at each maintenance test are
also shown in Table 2.
3. The number of times that a spurious system shut-
down occurs would be unacceptable if it was more
than once per year.
7 GENETIC ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATION
SGA–C is a C-language translation and extension of
the original Pascal simple genetic algorithm (SGA) code
presented by Goldman [8]. This package was used as a
framework to build the GA software for the safety
protection system optimization. Significant changes and
extensions were necessary to carry out the modelling of
the HIPS optimization.
Table 1 Design variables required
Design variableDesigner option
EHow many ESD valves are required (0, 1, 2)?
How many HIPS valves are required (0, 1, 2)? H
N1, N2How many pressure transmitters are required
for each subsystem (0, 1, 2, 3, 4)?
How many transmitters are required to trip? K1, K2
VWhich of two possible ESD/HIPS valves should
be selected?
Which of two possible pressure transmitters P
should be selected?
Maintenance test interval (MTI) for each u1, u2
subsystem (1 week–2 years)?
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Table 2 Component data
Dormant failures
Mean repair
timeFailure rateComponent Cost Test time
12Wing valve 1001.14×105 36.0
12Master valve 1.14×105 36.0 100
15HIPS1 2505.44×106 36.0
200 10HIPS2 1×105 36.0
15ESDV1 2505.44×106 36.0
200 10ESDV2 1×105 36.0
5Solenoid valve 205×106 36.0
1 2Relay contacts 0.23×106 36.0
1PT1 201.5×106 36.0
10PT2 27×106 36.0
20Computer logic 1×105 136.0
stated limits, the respective penalty is added to the
system unavailability of the design in question. The
forms of penalty function used are described in Section
10.2:
Q %SYS=QSYS+CPEN+MDTPEN+STPEN (1)
where
Q %SYS=penalized probability of system
unavailability
QSYS=unpenalized probability of system
unavailability
CPEN=penalty exerted due to excess cost
MDTPEN=penalty due to excess MDT
STPEN=penalty due to excess spurious trips
7.3 Reproduction probabilities
The fitness value, or penalized system unavailability, is
evaluated for each string. For the purpose of selection
in the GA, each string is assigned a reproduction
probability which is directly related to its fitness value.
In the safety system optimization problem the smaller
the fitness value, the fitter is the string, and hence the
greater should be its chance of reproduction. For cases
such as these a possible approach is to let the reproduc-
tion probability be one minus the fitness value. How-
ever, using a string’s availability produces all
reproduction probabilities of a similar value, thus de-
tracting from the fitness information available to the
GA. A more specific method is required which retains
the accuracy of each string’s fitness value during con-
version to its corresponding reproduction probability.
Section 10.3 considers this conversion method further
and investigates a more effective alternative.
8 RESULTS
The program was used with a population of ten strings.
A maximum of 50 generations was allowed together
with a mutation rate of 0.01 and cross-over rate of 0.7.
In total, therefore, 500 system evaluations were per-
formed in determining the best design. The running
time of the program was of the order of minutes. The
fittest string from the entire process arose in generation
15. The characteristics of this design are specified in
Table 3.
Convergence to a fit design through the GA is not
necessarily smooth. A particularly fit string may be
produced in an early generation as a result of its
random nature; else the structure of the GA may enable
uniform convergence to a fit string over later
generations.
7.1 Coding and initializing the population
To specify a safety system design a value is assigned to
each of the ten design parameters. These values are
then expressed in binary form and placed contiguously
to form a string of binary digits. Each parameter must
be allowed a particular length of the string, i.e. a
particular number of bits, in order to accommodate its
largest possible value in binary form. For example u1,
the parameter governing the MTI for subsystem 1
requires 7 bits to accommodate its maximum time span
of 104 weeks. In total each string representing all design
variables is 32 bits in length and can be interpreted as
a set of concatenated integers coded in binary form.
The restricted range of values assigned to each
parameter does not in each case correspond to the
representative binary range on the solution string. For
this reason a specialized procedure is used to code, to
initialize and, in subsequent generations, to check the
feasibility of each string [2].
7.2 Evaluating string fitness
Constraints are incorporated into the optimization by
penalizing the fitness when they are violated by the
design. The fitness of each string consists of four parts:
(a) probability of system failure, unavailability, QSYS,
(b) penalty for exceeding the total cost constraint,
(c) penalty for exceeding the total maintenance down-
time constraint and
(d) penalty for exceeding the spurious trip constraint.
The result is a sole fitness value for each design, re-
ferred to as the penalized system unavailability of the
design.
Calculating the penalized system unavailability in-
volves the derivation of the penalty formula for excess
cost, maintenance down-time (MDT) and spurious trip
occurrences. If a particular design exceeds any of the
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Table 3 Characteristics of the best design
Subsystem 1
Number of ESD valves 0
Number of PTs 3
Number of PTs to trip system 2
23MTI
Subsystem 2
Number of HIPS valves 2
3Number of PTs
Number of PTs to trip system 2
MTI 57
Valve type 2
1PT type
123 hMDT
Cost 842 units
0.455Spurious trip
System unavailability 0.001 12
Table 5 A summary of the quantitative results for the muta-
tion rates M1, M2 and M3
Mutation rate
M3M2M1
Sum of fitness values 0.015 031 0.017 101 0.018 992
1.25×10−3 1.42×10−3Average fitness value 1.58×10−3
Table 6 A summary of the quantitative results for the cross-
over rates C1, C2, C3 and C4
Crossover rate
C1 C2 C3 C4
0.011 9530.0130.013 6410.012 53Sum of
fitness
values
Average 1.044×10−3 1.37×10−3 1.08×10−3 9.96×10−4
fitness
value
9 THE GA PARAMETERS
The GA requires the following selection parameters to
be set:
(a) population size,
(b) cross-over rate,
(c) mutation rate and
(d) number of generations.
The values entered for these parameters have a
marked effect on the action of the GA. Using the
optimization software previously described, an analysis
was carried out to investigate the effect of changing
these parameter values. A limited set of values for each
parameter was chosen as in Table 4.
In total, 36 runs of the optimization were carried out,
thus ensuring that each possible combination of the
values above was analysed. The penalized system un-
availability of the best overall string per run was then
investigated for each parameter set.
To obtain an indication of the effect of setting each
parameter to a particular value the best penalized sys-
tem unavailability obtained for all the other parameter
values was summed and averaged. A summary of the
best results is given in Tables 5, 6 and 7, for the
mutation rate, cross-over rate and population size re-
spectively.
9.1 Discussion of the quantitative results
As might be expected, larger populations lead to a
better performance. When the population size doubles
from 10 to 20 strings the fitness value improves by 20
Table 7 A summary of the quantitative results for the popu-
lation sizes P1, P2 and P3
Population size
P2 P3P1
0.016 642 0.013 5520.020 93Sum of fitness values
Average fitness value 1.13×10−31.74×10−3 1.39×10−3
per cent. An additional 18 per cent improvement is
incurred when the initial population is further increased
to 50 individuals.
The mutation rate parameter implies that the largest
rate, 0.1, leads to the generation of a fitter string.
Strings produced in each run of the program with the
largest mutation rate were on average 20 per cent fitter
than program runs with the lowest rate. The cross-over
parameter again produced a slight bias towards the
highest value.
These results support a more random search. A
population of ten strings may not incorporate enough
diversity from the onset and for this reason a high
degree of mutation moves to areas in the search space,
which would otherwise not be explored. Too high a
mutation and cross-over rate, however, indicates that
the inherent properties of the GA have been lost and
the structured random search has degenerated to a
purely unstructured enumerative technique. A balance
between the diversity and processing time was made to
obtain the best results and it is suggested that a high
population size is selected together with a cross-over
rate of 0.7 and a mutation rate of 0.01.
Table 4 Chosen sets of parameter values
Mutation rate 0.1 0.01 0.001
0.80.5 0.7Cross-over rate 0.6
10Population size 20 50
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10 MODIFYING THE SGA
Having implemented the GA, areas of improvement
became apparent. The following sections consider these
areas in more detail.
10.1 Utilization of the MDT resource
The MTI parameters for each subsystem directly affect
the unavailability of a design. They also contribute to
the calculation of a system’s MDT, which exerts a
penalty on the system unavailability if 130 h is
exceeded.
Fully utilizing the 130 h MDT resource and splitting
the available effort between the two subsystems to the
best advantage will result in the most optimal system
unavailability. It was noted that very few designs pro-
duced in the GA approached this limit and, hence, are
not fully utilizing their available resources.
The MDT is governed by the values assigned to the
MTI parameters for subsystems 1 and 2. These MTI
parameters span a much greater range of values than
the other parameters and hence occupy a greater pro-
portion of the string. The test parameters have a much
larger area of the search space to explore. This knowl-
edge supports the evidence from a quantitative analysis,
implying a need for greater variation within this area of
the string. Three methods to improve the exploration of
the range of values allowed by the MTI parameters
have been explored, as discussed in Subsections 10.1.1
to 10.1.3.
10.1.1 MDT modification method 1
In method 1 the GA executes in the normal manner
and a best overall string is deduced. This best system
design is then sent to an additional routine. Within this
routine a loop checks the system unavailability for each
feasible combination of test intervals for subsystems 1
and 2. Any infeasible combination with an MDT ex-
ceeding 130 h is ignored. The combination of MTIs 1
and 2 resulting in the most optimal system performance
is retained.
10.1.2 MDT modification method 2
Method 2 introduces greater search to the MTI area of
the string, without affecting the rest of the design. This
method uses the inversion operator.
Inversion is a reversal of a segment of the string.
Consider, for example, the string S, given by
S=1 0 0 0 1 1 1
----------
1 1 0 1 1 1 0
If cut points a and b are generated, e.g. a=2 and b=7,
S %=1 0 1 1 1 0 0
----------
1 1 0 1 1 1 0
The string S % is the original string with the bits 2 to 7
inverted.
Cross-over and mutation are carried out in the latter
part of each string pair only, i.e. between bits 15 and
32. Consequently, following the action of the two ge-
netic operators the MTI area of the string is unaffected.
Each new string is then further processed. The string is
first decoded to obtain the MTI values for each subsys-
tem. These are stored. The MTI area of each string is
then inverted between two randomly generated points a
and b, where 00aBb014. Following inversion the
modified MTI values are established and stored. Four
potential MTI parameter combinations now exist for
the two subsystems. The resulting combinations are
considered in one of two ways.
Method 2a evaluates the MDT associated with each
MTI combination using the MDT formula. The pair of
values that result in the MDT closest to but not greater
than 130 h are retained. If all resulting MDT values are
greater than 130 h, the test intervals associated with the
lowest are kept. The penalty formula is enforced as in
the original GA.
Method 2b evaluates the system unavailability in
addition to the MDT for each MTI combination.
Should any pair of test intervals exceed 130 h MDT the
respective penalty is added to the system unavailability
for that combination. The test intervals resulting in the
lowest penalized system unavailability are retained.
10.1.3 MDT modification method 3
Method 3 is a mixture of methods 1 and 2. As in
method 2, cross-over and mutation are carried out in
the latter part of each string only. Each string is then
processed in the MTI area. Each string enters a loop, as
with method 1, that checks the system unavailability of
the design for every feasible combination of test
parameters in the range. The pair of test parameters
resulting in the best system performance for each sys-
tem is retained. The population of strings, therefore,
enters the next generation with each design fully utiliz-
ing all the available MDT resource.
10.1.4 Results of the GA using the MDT
modification methods
The GA with MDT modification methods 1, 2a and 2b
and 3 was tested. Each method improved the utilization
of MDT resources, thus improving the performance of
the system. Method 1 does not affect the GA process
directly. The MDT is considered after as opposed to
during the design stage, as is typical of most engineer-
ing disciplines. It is common engineering practice to
ensure that the resulting design achieves its most opti-
mal performance.
Method 3 ensures that all resources are used at all
times, eliminates the need for an MDT penalty formula
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and results in the best system performance. This
method, however, relies on a very large number of
system unavailability evaluations and may be consid-
ered impractical for larger systems.
Method 2 achieves the desired intention to intro-
duce greater variety into the test interval parameter
area of the string. Full use of the MDT resource is
not guaranteed but the general case results in conver-
gence towards the limit. The advantage of this
method is that it is incorporated within the design
process and does not require an excessive number of
extra system unavailability evaluations.
Method 3 achieves the best results for the HIPS
system. It is probable that method 2b would be more
practical for larger safety systems. This explores extra
safety system evaluations but not to excess.
10.2 Derivation of the penalty formula
If the performance of a design is significantly im-
proved owing to a comparatively small excess in one
or more of the constraints, the design in question
deserves further consideration. An excessive abuse of
the limits with only a small degree of performance
improvement conversely implies that the design be
discarded. It is essential that an appropriate penalty
be exerted to the system unavailability when con-
straints are violated which retain these features.
A spurious trip results in loss of production of the
industrial system, and hence loss of profit. For this
reason a spurious trip is expressed in terms of excess
cost and the cost penalty formula used. The penalty
formula under consideration is, therefore, that regard-
ing cost.
The cost penalty in the original SGA is derived
from the formula
Cost penalty=
excess cost
100
5/4
×0.002 (2)
A base level in system performance is assumed. An
unavailability of 0.02 for a system is considered rea-
sonably fit. Should the cost of a design exceed 1000
units, the excess cost percentage should be reflected in
the system unavailability as a corresponding percent-
age improvement about the base level. Thus, a design
which costs 1100 units should show an improvement
of at least 0.002. This relationship is linear. Small
excesses in cost may be tolerated but, as the extra
cost becomes much larger, its feasibility significantly
decreases [2]. For this reason an exponential relation-
ship is preferred, as given in equation (2).
The multiplying factor of 0.002, 10 per cent of the
base level performance, is the area of concern. This
value is a fixed percentage of a fixed system un-
availability. Owing to the set form of the multiplying
factor the penalty formula does not take into account
the system unavailability of the particular design be-
ing penalized.
To illustrate this, consider the following example:
1. Design A costs 1150 units and has an unpenal-
ized system unavailability of 0.015. Apply the
cost penalty formula
150
100
5/4
×0.002=0.0033 (3)
The penalized fitness value is 0.018, a fitness
decrement of approximately 18 per cent.
2. Design B costs 1150 units and has an unpenal-
ized system unavailability of 0.002. Applying the
cost penalty formula also gives a penalty of
0.0033. The penalized fitness value is then 0.0053,
a fitness decrement of approximately 62 per cent.
The comparative penalty for the fitter string is much
greater. The penalty should take the fitness value of
the system to be penalized into consideration.
An alternative penalty formula is introduced which
takes into account both the cost violation and the
system unavailability of the design being penalized.
This is achieved using a multiplying factor which,
rather than being fixed, varies according to the sys-
tem unavailability of the design.
Consider a particular design with cost C. The cost
C exceeds 1000 units. The percentage excess of the
system’s cost is calculated, XC say. The multiplying
factor is derived by calculating XC per cent of the
system unavailability of the design under consider-
ation. In the designs A and B previously stated, both
designs exceed 1000 units by 15 per cent, i.e. XC=15
per cent. The system unavailability of design A is
0.015, of which 15 per cent is 0.0025. The multiplying
factor to be used in the penalty formula for this de-
sign is, therefore, 0.0025. Hence, apply the penalty
formula
Cost penalty=
150
100
5/4
×0.0025=0.0041 (4)
The penalized fitness value is 0.0191, a 22 per cent
decrement. The system unavailability of design B is
0.002, of which 15 per cent is 0.0003. Hence, apply
the cost penalty formula
Cost penalty=
150
100
5/4
×0.0003=0.000 49 (5)
The penalized fitness value is 0.0025, a 20 per cent
decrement.
Altering the cost penalty formula enables a more
detailed exploration around the border of the search
space. The lack of final system designs from the origi-
nal GA that portray a slight excess in either the cost
or trip constraints implies that the penalty exerted is
too great.
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10.3 Converting the fitness value to a roulette wheel
percentage
Each design receives a measure of its fitness. This is the
design string’s penalized system unavailability. This
value is not in an appropriate form to be directly used
in the selection process of the GA since, the smaller the
fitness, the better is the design.
A specialized conversion method is required. It is
imperative that the conversion method gives rise to
roulette wheel percentages in accordance with the
fitness value of each string. A system whose perfor-
mance is twice as good as another should have twice
the percentage allocation.
The original conversion method allocates each string
to one of three categories according to its fitness value.
The ranges of values covered by each category are given
in Table 8.
Each string in category 1 is automatically given zero
per cent. This category consists of poor system designs.
If they do not feature on the roulette wheel, they will be
eliminated from the succeeding generation.
Category 2 contains relatively unfit designs. It is,
however, important to retain a little diversity in the
population. Each string is allocated some portion of a
total of 5 per cent of the roulette wheel.
The strings that fall into category 3 are of ultimate
interest. To enhance their fitness values each string is
subtracted from the upper category limit, 0.1. A partic-
ular amount of the remaining 95 per cent of the roulette
wheel is then allocated to each string, depending on
how much their fitness value exceeds the 0.1 limit.
Problems occur when a very high, or a very low,
proportion of strings fall into a particular category. The
percentage allocated to each category is fixed and,
therefore, independent of the number of strings that it
contains.
An alternative method is required which is able to
cope with very diverse populations and simultaneously
to show sensitivity to a highly fit set of strings. Initially
nine categories are depicted which cover the area of the
fitness domain of importance, i.e. below 0.2, and each
category is assigned a particular weight, as shown in
Table 9. As the category becomes fitter, its weight
increases in size.
The fundamental steps of the modified method are
then as follows:
1. Firstly each category is designated a particular per-
centage of the roulette wheel depending on:
Table 9 Nine categories plus weights
Fitness domain
Lower limitUpper limit WeightCategory
0.2 12\ 0.1E1
220.05E0.1 \ 2
\0.05 3 E 0.01 32
0.01 0.005 42\ 4 E
0.005 0.004 52\ 5 E
620.003E6\0.004
E 0.002 720.003 \ 7
0.002 820.001E8\
E9\ 920.001 0
(a) the number of strings, n, of the total population
N in the category and
(b) the weight assigned to the category.
2. The percentage allocated to each category is then
distributed appropriately between the strings within.
The method used must ensure that a system in a
fitter category is given a greater percentage than a
poorer design in a less fit category.
The following sections describe steps 1 and 2 in
greater detail.
10.3.1 Establish the percentage allocation for each
category
Each string in the population is considered in turn. It is
first established into which category the string falls. As
in the original method the fitness value is enhanced by
subtracting its value from the upper limit of the least-fit
category, namely 0.2. The enhanced fitness value is then
multiplied by the weight associated with the category
into which the string falls. The ‘weighted’ values of the
strings in each separate category are summed. The
result is that each category is designated a particular
value directly related to the number of strings that it
contains and its weight. Using these designated values
the relative percentage of each category is calculated.
10.3.2 Distribute the percentage of each category
between the strings that it contains
Having established the percentage allocated to each
category, the average percentage allocated to each
string within each category can be evaluated. As the
categories become fitter, the average percentage allo-
cated to each string should increase.
The important aspect here is to ensure that strings in
fitter categories are given a larger percentage than those
in less-fit categories. For each category, the average
percentage allocated to each string in the previous
non-empty category is ascertained. As regards category
9, this is always zero.
Table 8 Range of values of categories of fitness
values
Upper limitLower limit Category
0.10 00 3
0 0.20.1 B 2
1.00.2 B 1 0
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The total percentage appointed to each category is
split into two parts: a ‘used’ and an ‘excess’ percent-
age. Each string in a category, X say, must be given a
percentage at least that of the average allocated to each
string in the most previous non-empty category, as
previously determined. If category X contains n from N
strings in the population, the ‘used’ percentage is
catXused=n×prevavX
where
catXused= ‘used percentage of category X
prevavX=average percentage allocated to each
string in the most previous
non-empty category
The ‘excess’ percentage for a category is, therefore, its
total minus its ‘used’ percentage. Each string in a
category is first given the average percentage allocation
of each string in the most previous non-empty category.
An additional portion of the categories’ ‘excess’ per-
centage is then given to each string.
10.3.3 Results comparing both con6ersion methods
The GA was tested with ten program runs, over 50
generations using the modified conversion method. The
overall system performance was improved using the
modified method. Most importantly the new approach
has a better ability to converge on a very fit design.
10.3.4 Discussion of the con6ersion method results
The original method is not able to cope adequately with
highly fit populations of system designs. The fitness
values of the strings are not accurately represented, and
hence the information used by the GA is not in accor-
dance with the actual fitness information of the
population.
The modified method is able to differentiate between
the strings in the fitter population, while simultaneously
retaining the ability to handle a varied population.
Essential information is not lost in the conversion
process. The best design obtained using the modified
conversion method had the characteristics shown in
Table 10.
11 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The modified cost penalty and the modified conversion
method together with MDT modification method 3
(described in Section 10) is established as the preferred
GA method. It ensures that all MDT resources are used
at all times and are distributed between both subsys-
tems to the best advantage. As such, potentially fit
designs are not eliminated owing to inferior MTI val-
ues. This method, however, requires a large number of
system unavailability evaluations and may be consid-
ered impractical for larger systems (in which case
method 2a, plus application of method 1 to the result-
ing design, should be used). Analysing the system un-
availability of only those test interval combinations
within a specific range of the MDT limit effectively
reduces computer effort. Adapting the exhaustive ap-
proach to calculate the MDT values only, thus incur-
ring no extra demand on system unavailability
evaluations, is an alternative method with much less
demand on processing time. This distribution of
maintenance values between each subsystem may not,
in this case, be optimal.
The modified GA demonstrates the ability to find
and explore the fittest areas of the search space. This is
achieved via full usage of available MDT resources and
a thorough exploration of the boundary of the domain.
It is able to differentiate between highly fit strings as
the algorithm progresses and retention of the best de-
sign over latter generations is achieved.
The modified GA has been applied to a firewater
deluge system (FDS) on an offshore platform. The FDS
is a larger, more complex system than the HIPS, which
has in excess of 4.4×1010 design variations. The fault
tree used to quantify this system has more than 450
gates and 420 basic events and requires conversion to
17 BDDs.
Analysis of the FDS was carried out using the
modified GA. The average fitness of the initial popula-
tion was 0.207. The population average fitness reduced
to 0.0157 when convergence was achieved. The most
optimal design arose in generation 48 with a fitness
value of 0.013 26. The running time of the program was
of the order of 1 h on a workstation.
Table 10 Characteristics of the best design
obtained using the modified conver-
sion method
Subsystem 1
0Number of ESD valves
Number of PTs 4
Number of PTs to trip system 1
MTI 38
Subsystem 2
Number of HIPS valves 2
Number of PTs 4
2Number of PTs to trip system
30MTI
Valve type 2
PT type 1
MDT 120 h
Cost 882 units
Spurious trip 0.978
System unavailability 0.000 94
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Design projects require many months to progress
from the initial conceptual design through to detailed
design. Whether the use of computer time to aid this
process takes a matter of minutes or a number of days
is, therefore, not the issue and such differences are
considered unimportant.
12 CONCLUSIONS
1. An automated robust design optimization process
has been developed in which the adequacy of the
system performance is assessed using fault tree anal-
ysis. A single fault tree represents the causes of
failure for each possible design alternative of a
safety system. Implicit and explicit constraint forms
have been incorporated to place limits on the design
specification. The solution of this type of problem is
made possible by use of the BDDs to solve the fault
tree.
2. The GA has been shown to produce good results for
system design optimization. It is a robust method,
which can potentially be applied to a wide range of
systems.
3. The practicality of the overall design optimization
process has been demonstrated by successful appli-
cations to a high-pressure protection system.
4. Investigation of the results of the relatively small
problem of the HIPS has highlighted possible
difficulties in the GA’s exploration of the design
space. Problems can occur with the MTI variables
and their relationship with the constraint limiting
the MDT of the system. This parameter also domi-
nated, i.e. required a larger portion of the design
string than, the other variables which can result in
an inadequate exploration of the parameter’s search
space.
5. The simple GA has been modified to overcome the
difficulties in its application to the high-pressure
protection system to give a very effective design
tool.
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